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L Im4eicn
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in R4g v A izom ' invalidated
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme because it allowed a judge, rather than a jury,
to determine "fact[s] on which the legislature conditions an increase in ...
maximum punishment."2 Relyng onAippamx v Newerey,3 the Court noted that
a factor " 'used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statu-
tory sentence ... is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense
than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict.' "' Although R4 expressly
reserved judgment on the question of whether aggravators must be alleged in an
indictment, the Court previously stated in J]0r v Um State' that "any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment."6 In light of these decisions, Billie Jerome
Allen ("Allen") and Steven Fortin ("Fortin") petitioned the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court of NewJersey, respec-
tively, to reconsider the courts' prior holdings that aggravating factors do not
need to be charged in an indictment
1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. R* 536 U.S. at 605 (quoting Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 US. 466, 494 n.19 (2000));
seeAppmi, 530 US. at 494 n.19 (stating that a sentencing factor is the functional equivalent of an
element).
5. 526 US. 227 (1999).
6. Jones v. United States, 526 US. 227,243 n.6 (1999); seRir 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (reserv-
ing judgment on the indictment issue).
7. United States v. Allen, No. 98-2549, 2004 WL 188080, at *1, *3 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2004);
State v. Fortin, No. A-31-2001, 2004 WL 190051, at *1, *46 (N.J. Feb. 3, 2004).
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IL. Hckkng
In A fen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated
Allen's death sentence and remanded his case to the district court for the imposi-
tion of a life sentence.8 The court held that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that aggravating factors be submitted to the grand jury and
charged in the indictment.9 In Fotin* the Supreme Court of NewJerseyreversed
and remanded on other grounds but held that pursuant to Rin and the New
Jersey Constitution's guarantee in all criminal trials of the right to a grand jury
indictment, aggravators must be charged in the indictment.' The New Jersey
rule applies prospectively to all capital murder trials that have yet to reach the
penaltyphase."
IX. A nisU ard Appliatin m Virg
The failure of an indictment to charge aggravators denies a defendant the
protections of the Fifth Amendment Grand JuryClause in a federal prosecution
and the Sixth Amendment right to notice. 2 A Yen and Foyn, however, limited the
inquiry to the right to a grand jury indictment. 3 The Eighth Circuit, subjecting
Allen's indictment defect to harmless-error review, found that Allen "was denied
the first of a constitutionally-mandated two-tiered check on prosecutorial
power- a protection which reaches paramount importance in a capital case." 4
The court noted that if it was to consider all indictment errors harmless, the Fifth
Amendment right would be strictly curtailed."5
In Foym, the Supreme Court of NewJersey held that aggravators must be
charged in the indictment but that the new rule would only be applied prospec-
tively because the court was expressly overruling prior precedent and the accu-
8. Afle? 2004 WL 188080, at *12.
9. Id at *2; ser U.S. CO1MT. amend. V (stating that "[nlo person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury").
For a complete discussion and analysis of these issues, seegwmny Maxwell Smith, Case Note, 16
CAP. DEF.J. 499 (2004) (analyzing United States v. I- ggs, 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003)).
10. Font, 2004 WL 190051, at *46; se N.J. CONST. art. 1, S 8 (guaranteeing that no person
shall be held for a criminal offense unless charged by a grand jury indictment).
11. For*n, 2004 W. 190051, at *54.
12. Se United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that an
indictment that fails to allege an element violates the Sixth Amendment right to notice); see also
Lnited States v. Cotton, 535 US. 625,627 (2002) (stating that the Fifth Amendment requires facts
that increase a penalty beyond the statutory maximum to be charged in the indictment).
13. The notice issue was not raised with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and the Eighth
Circuit found that the case at issue did not present the usual problems of notice accompanying
deficient indictments. All, 2004 WL 188080, at *5.
14. Id at *10.
15. Id at *9.
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racyof the sentence was not seriously affected bythe failure.1 The court also
noted that its decision should not limit the flexibilityof the prosecutors "as they
go about the difficult task of deciding which murder cases merit a capital prosecu-
tion."'" If the prosecutor should choose to seek the death penalty at a later time,
he could seek a supplemental indictment by later submitting the aggravators to
a grand jury.8
In Virginia, there is no constitutional right to a grand jury indictment.
However, the statutoryright to a grand juryindictment has existed since Virginia
was a colonyand has been vigorously protected since that time. 9 The failure of
the Commonwealth to allege aggravators in the indictment violates this statutory
right and results in a charge of capital murder, but the defendant cannot be
eligible for the death penalty.
IV. Ccndzon
The Supreme Court of Virginia is likelyto be confronted with the issue of
aggravators in the indictment in the near future. Capital defense attorneys
should, therefore, continue to follow the case law on this subject matter. In
addition, because there are several important tactical considerations at play,
practitioners are invited to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
K. Brent Tomer
16. Fmwt, 2004 WL 190051, at *54.
17. d at *55.
18. Id
19. Se An Act Directing the Method of Trial of Criminals for Capital Offenses, and for
Other Purposes Therein Mentioned, 1748, 22 Geo. 2, c. 13, S 5 (Va.) (directing a grand jury to first
inquire into all treasons and felonies before prosecution); seabso Commonwealth v. Cawood, 4 Va.
(2 Va. Cos.) 527, 541 (1826) (stating that a proper accusation from a grand jury "is as indispensable
as the conviction").
2004]

